re always
extremely sensitive.

From local conditions the French preparations had to be made in several
separate places; it was the task of the British Navy to prevent the
concentration of these different detachments in a joint effort. The
troops must embark, of course, from some place near to England; their
principal points of assembly were on the Channel, whence they were to
cross in flat-boats, and in the Biscay ports, from Brest to the mouth of
the Loire. The Bay of Quiberon, from which Hawke's action takes its
name, lies between the two latter points. It is sheltered from the full
force of the Atlantic gales by a peninsula of the same name, and by some
shoals which prolong the barrier to the southward of the promontory.

To cross safely, it was necessary to provide naval protection. To this
end squadrons were equipped in Toulon and in Brest. Combined at the
latter point, and further strengthened by divisions expected to return
from North America, they would constitute a force of very serious
consideration in point of numbers. Rochefort also was an element in the
problem, though a minor one; for either the small force already there
might join the concentration, or, if the port were unwatched, the
American or other divisions might get in there, and be at least so much
nearer to Brest, or to a neighboring point of assembly, as Quiberon Bay.

As the French Navy was essential to the French crossing, as its junction
was essential to action, as the point of junction was at or near
Brest--for there was the district near which the troops were
assembling--and as by far the largest detachment was already in Brest,
that port became the important centre upon blocking which depended
primarily the thwarting of the invasion. If the French Navy succeeded in
concentrating at Brest, the first move in the game would be lost. Hawke
therefore had the double duty of not allowing the squadron there to get
out without fighting, and of closing the entrance to reinforcements. The
latter was far the more difficult, and could not be assured beyond the
chance of failure, because an on-shore gale, which would carry his fleet
into the Channel to avoid being driven on the French coast, would be
fair for an outside enemy to run into the port, friendly to him. This
actually occurred at a most critical moment, but it could only happen by
a combination of circumstances; that is, by the hostile squadron
chancing to arrive at a moment when the British