osity
doubtless acted as a spur to laggards, but it was accompanied by a
tendency to overbearing insolence that not infrequently browbeats
cautious wisdom. When applied to a man like Hawke, strong in natural
temper and in conscious mastery of his profession, the tone
characteristic of Pitt provokes an equally resolute self-assertion, as
far removed from subjection as it is from insubordination; but
friendship becomes impossible, and even co-operation difficult.

Throughout all Hawke kept his head, and made no serious mistake; but he
accepts no unmerited censures. Seeing that the transports are not enough
for the healthful carriage of the troops, he so represents it. The
government, already impatient at any report of defects, hopes that
things are now arranged to his _satisfaction_. "I am astonished at this
expression," he says, "it is my duty to represent defects, but I am
_satisfied_ with any decision _you_ make." Again, "I have received your
letter signifying His Majesty's directions to use the utmost diligence
in embarking the troops and getting to sea. As I cannot doubt my letter
of Sunday being immediately communicated to you, I should have expected
that _before yours was sent_ His Majesty would have been fully satisfied
that I needed no spur in executing his orders." As Hawke and Anson--the
First Lord--were friends, there can be little doubt that we see here a
firm protest against the much lauded tone to which the efficiency of the
British army and navy under Pitt has been too exclusively attributed. It
was in the civil administration, the preparation that underlies military
success, which being at home was under his own eye, that Pitt's energy
was beneficially felt, and also in his prompt recognition of fit
instruments; but he had no need to discover Hawke or Boscawen. He might
as well be thought to have discovered the sun.

In discharging his part of the expedition Hawke's course is consistent
and clear. It must in the first place be recognized that such
enterprises are of secondary importance, and do not warrant the risks
which are not only justifiable but imperative when a decisive issue is
at stake. Hawke's heroic disregard of pilotage difficulties at Quiberon,
in 1759, would have been culpable temerity at Basque Roads, in 1757.
But, save delays on this account, no time is lost by him. When the
decision to land is reached, he is clear as to the possibility of
landing; but when the generals think it impossibl