he most part, though not universally, slightly varied in their
meaning.

'These slight variations of meaning,' he proceeds, add to the
copiousness of the English language, by affording words of more or less
familiarity, and of greater and less force. This may easily be
understood, if we consider that the branch of the Teutonic, spoken in
England during the Anglo-Saxon period, never became extinct, but that
three-fourths of the English language at present consist of words
altered or derived from that ancient dialect; that these words usually
express the most familiar ideas--such as _man_, _house_, _land_, &c.;
and that the French terms gradually introduced, being those of a more
highly civilised people, were adapted to express the more refined ideas.
This is true even of physical objects; thus, for instance, most of the
names of the animals used for food are still Teutonic--such as _ox_,
_sheep_, _swine_, &c. The Anglo-Saxons, like the modern Germans, had no
objection to say _ox-flesh_, _sheep-flesh_, _swine's-flesh_; but the
Norman conquerors, introducing a more refined cookery, introduced with
it French words for the flesh of the animal; hence we have _beef_,
_mutton_, _pork_, &c.'

It has not been the author's design to notice _all_ the synonyms in the
language--that, as he remarks, would be an almost endless undertaking;
'but merely, after excluding technical terms, and words which do exactly
coincide, to select a few of those groups of words which are in most
frequent use, and are most liable to be confounded.' His purpose,
perhaps, will be more distinctly shewn, if we add a few more sentences
from the preface.

'Many persons,' says he, 'imagine that two words must either coincide
precisely in their meaning, so as to be, in the primary and strict sense
of the word, "synonymous," or else stand for two (more or less) distinct
_things_. Indeed, it would often be regarded as almost a truism to
assert this; but those who maintain such an opinion overlook the fact,
that two words, without exactly coinciding in sense, may nevertheless
relate to one and the same thing, regarded in _two different points of
view_. An illustration of this is afforded in the relation which exists
between the words, "inference" and "proof." Whoever justly infers,
proves; and whoever proves, infers; but the word "inference" leads the
mind from the premises which have been assumed, to the conclusion which
follows from them; while the word "proo