n of affairs, that the
boats of the bridges across the Wahal and the Rhine were disposed of for
commercial purposes; and in the beginning of 1795, says Jomini, "the
conquerors of Belgium and Holland had not even a bridge equipage, at a
time too when the success of the campaign depended solely on the means
of crossing a river." A few boats were procured from the Wahal and the
Meuse, and others manufactured in the forests of the Moselle; but "these
operations consumed precious time, and _four months_ thus passed away in
preparations." Even after other things were all ready, the army was
obliged to wait thirty days for the arrival of boats for ponton bridges;
during this delay the Austrians strengthened their position, and with
very little exertion they might easily have prevented the passage.

In 1796, profiting by the errors of the former campaigns, the French
collected more suitable bridge equipages, and the two armies passed the
Rhine at Neuweid and Kehl without loss or delay. The latter of these
passages has often been referred to as a model for such operations, and
certainly does credit to the general who directed it. But Moreau's
bridge equipage having been destroyed during this disastrous campaign,
his operations the following year were considerably delayed in preparing
a new one, and even then he was under the necessity of seizing all
private boats that could be found within reach; but the difficulty of
collecting and using boats of all sizes and descriptions was so great as
entirely to defeat his plan of surprising the enemy on the opposite
bank of the river. The necessity of co-operating with Hoche admitted of
no further delay, and he was now obliged to force his passage in the
open day, and in face of the enemy. Undertaken under such circumstances,
"the enterprise was extremely sanguinary, and at one time very
doubtful;" and had it failed, "Moreau's army would have been ruined for
the campaign."

Napoleon's celebrated passage of the Po, at Placentia, shows plainly how
important it is for a general to possess the means of crossing rivers.
"I felt the importance of hastening the enterprise in order not to allow
the enemy time to prevent it. But the Po, which is a river as wide and
deep as the Rhine, is a barrier difficult to be overcome. We had no
means of constructing a bridge, and were obliged to content ourselves
with the means of embarkation found at Placentia and its environs.
Lannes, chief of brigade, cros