eral added a quantity of iron-work taken from the wheels of
carriages that were abandoned on the march. Much was sacrificed to bring
off these valuable materials for making clamps and fastenings, but, as
Segur observes, that exertion '_sauva l'armee_.'"

But it is not always in the possession of a thing that we are most
likely to appreciate its utility; the evils and inconveniences resulting
from the want of it not unfrequently impress us most powerfully with its
importance and the advantages to be derived from its possession. A few
examples of this nature, drawn from military history, may be
instructive. We need not go back to the disastrous passage of the
Vistula by Charles XII., the failure of Marlborough to pass the Dyle,
and Eugene to cross the Adda in 1705, nor of the three unsuccessful
attempts of Charles of Lorraine to cross the Rhine in 1743. The wars
following the French Revolution are sufficiently replete with useful
instruction on this subject.[39]

[Footnote 39: Before recurring to these, it might be useful to give one
example, as it is often referred to, in the campaign of 1702. It was
deemed important for the success of the campaign to attack the Prince of
Baden in his camp at Friedlingen. Accordingly, a bridge was thrown
across the Rhine at Huningen, the passage effected, and the victory
gained. But Villars was several times on the point of losing all for
want of a sufficient ponton equipage. Having but a _single_ bridge, the
passage was necessarily slow; the artillery and stores were frequently
interrupted by the infantry hurrying to the field of battle; disorder
ensued, and the whole movement was retarded; Villars could bring only a
small part of his artillery into action, and towards the close of the
battle the infantry were in want of ammunition: moreover, the whole
operation had nearly failed from the attempt of the enemy to destroy
this bridge, but the skill of the French pontoniers saved it. We here
remark, 1st, the passage secured to Villars an important victory; 2d,
from having an inefficient bridge-equipage his whole army was placed in
great peril, and the operation had nearly failed; 3d, if the Prince of
Baden had possessed a skilful corps to oppose that of Villars, this
single bridge would have been destroyed, and the army cut to pieces;
4th, the skill of the little corps of French pontoniers saved the
bridge, and of consequence, the army.]

In 1794 so great was the disorder in the directio