Great Britain looks upon as the
fundamental principles of naval warfare." One learns also from other
sources, that efforts are being made to arrive, by a series of
compromises, at some common understanding upon the points as to which
the differences of view between the Powers are most pronounced. It may,
however, be safely predicted that many years must elapse before any such
result will be achieved.

In the meantime, a very different solution of the difficulty has
commended itself to the partisans of the proposed Court. M. Renault, the
accomplished Reporter of the committee which deals in the first instance
with the subject, after stating that "sur beaucoup de points le droit de
la guerre maritime est encore incertain, et chaque Etat le formule au
gre de ses idees et de ses interets," lays down that, in accordance with
strict juridical reasoning, when international law is silent an
international Court should apply the law of the captor. He is,
nevertheless, prepared to recommend, as the spokesman of the committee,
that in such cases the Judges should decide "d'apres les principes[C]
generaux de la justice et de l'equite"--a process which I had, less
complimentarily, described as "evolving new rules out of their inner
consciousness." The Court, in pursuance of this confessedly "hardie
solution," would be called upon to "faire le droit."

One may be permitted to hope that this proposal will not be accepted.
The beneficent action of English Judges in developing the common law of
England may possibly be cited in its favour; but the analogy is
delusive. The Courts of a given country in evolving new rules of law are
almost certain to do so in accordance with the views of public policy
generally entertained in that country. Should they act otherwise their
error can be promptly corrected by the national Legislature. Far
different would be the effect of the decision of an international Court,
in which, though it might run directly counter to British theory and
practice, Great Britain would have bound herself beforehand to
acquiesce. The only quasi-legislative body by which the _ratio
decidendi_ of such a decision could be disallowed would be an
international gathering in which British views might find scanty
support. The development of a system of national law by national Judges
offers no analogy to the working of an international Court, empowered,
at its free will and pleasure, to disregard the views of a sovereign
Power as