d, for
anarchy has a more formidable aspect in democratic countries than
elsewhere. As the citizens have no direct influence on each other, as
soon as the supreme power of the nation fails, which kept them all in
their several stations, it would seem that disorder must instantly
reach its utmost pitch, and that, every man drawing aside in a different
direction, the fabric of society must at once crumble away.
I am, however, persuaded that anarchy is not the principal evil which
democratic ages have to fear, but the least. For the principle
of equality begets two tendencies; the one leads men straight to
independence, and may suddenly drive them into anarchy; the other
conducts them by a longer, more secret, but more certain road, to
servitude. Nations readily discern the former tendency, and are prepared
to resist it; they are led away by the latter, without perceiving its
drift; hence it is peculiarly important to point it out. For myself, I
am so far from urging as a reproach to the principle of equality that it
renders men untractable, that this very circumstance principally calls
forth my approbation. I admire to see how it deposits in the mind
and heart of man the dim conception and instinctive love of political
independence, thus preparing the remedy for the evil which it engenders;
it is on this very account that I am attached to it.
Chapter II: That The Notions Of Democratic Nations On Government Are
Naturally Favorable To The Concentration Of Power
The notion of secondary powers, placed between the sovereign and his
subjects, occurred naturally to the imagination of aristocratic nations,
because those communities contained individuals or families raised above
the common level, and apparently destined to command by their birth,
their education, and their wealth. This same notion is naturally wanting
in the minds of men in democratic ages, for converse reasons: it
can only be introduced artificially, it can only be kept there with
difficulty; whereas they conceive, as it were, without thinking upon the
subject, the notion of a sole and central power which governs the whole
community by its direct influence. Moreover in politics, as well as
in philosophy and in religion, the intellect of democratic nations is
peculiarly open to simple and general notions. Complicated systems are
repugnant to it, and its favorite conception is that of a great nation
composed of citizens all resembling the same pattern, a
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