oice."

Ioasaph asked, "What is free will and what is choice?" The elder
answered, "Free will is the willing of a reasonable soul, moving
without hindrance toward whatever it wisheth, whether to virtue or to
vice, the soul being thus constituted by the Creator. Free will again
is the sovran motion of an intelligent soul. Choice is desire
accompanied by deliberation, or deliberation accompanied by desire for
things that lie in our power; for in choosing we desire that which we
have deliberately preferred. Deliberation is a motion towards enquiry
about actions possible to us; a man deliberateth whether he ought to
pursue an object or no. Then he judgeth which is the better, and so
ariseth judgement. Then he is inclined towards it, and loveth that
which was so judged by the deliberative faculty, and this is called
resolve; for, if he judge a thing, and yet be not inclined toward the
thing that he hath judged, and love it not, it is not called resolve.
Then, after inclination toward it, there ariseth choice or rather
selection. For choice is to choose one or other of two things in view,
and to select this rather than that. And it is manifest that choice is
deliberation plus discrimination, and this from the very etymology.
For that which is the 'object of choice' is the thing chosen before the
other thing. And no man preferreth a thing without deliberation, nor
makeeth a choice without having conceived a preference. For, since we
are not zealous to carry into action all that seemeth good to us,
choice only ariseth and the deliberately preferred only becometh the
chosen, when desire is added thereto. Thus we conclude that choice is
desire accompanied by deliberation for things that lie in our power; in
choosing we desire that which we have deliberately preferred. All
deliberation aimeth at action and dependeth on action; and thus
deliberation goeth before all choice, and choice before all action.
For this reason not only our actions, but also our thoughts, inasmuch
as they give occasion for choice, bring in their train crowns or
punishments. For the beginning of sin and righteous dealing is choice,
exercised in action possible to us. Where the power of activity is
ours, there too are the actions that follow that activity in our power.
Virtuous activities are in our power, therefore in our power are
virtues also; for we are absolute masters over all our souls' affairs
and all our deliberations. Since then it is o