I know that I doubt, desire, or that something is wanting to me,
and that I am not wholly perfect, if I possessed no idea of a being more
perfect than myself, by comparison with which I knew the deficiencies of
my nature?

And it cannot be said that this idea of God is perhaps materially false,
and consequently that it may have arisen from nothing (in other words,
that it may exist in me from my imperfection), as I before said of the
ideas of heat and cold, and the like; for on the contrary, as this idea
is very clear and distinct, and contains in itself more objective
reality than any other, there can be no one of itself more true, or less
open to the suspicion of falsity.

The idea, I say, of a being supremely perfect and infinite, is in the
highest degree true; for although perhaps we may imagine that such a
being does not exist, we nevertheless cannot suppose that this idea
represents nothing real, as I have already said of the idea of cold. It
is likewise clear and distinct in the highest degree, since whatever the
mind clearly and distinctly conceives as real or true, and as implying
any perfection, is contained entire in this idea. And this is true,
nevertheless, although I do not comprehend the infinite, and although
there may be in God an infinity of things that I cannot comprehend, nor
perhaps even compass by thought in any way; for it is of the nature of
the infinite that it should not be comprehended by the finite: and it is
enough that I rightly understand this, and judge that all which I
clearly perceive, and in which I know there is some perfection, and
perhaps also an infinity of properties of which I am ignorant, are
formally or eminently in God, in order that the idea I have of him may
become the most true, clear, and distinct of all the ideas in my mind.

But perhaps I am something more than I suppose myself to be; and it may
be that all those perfections which I attribute to God in some way exist
potentially in me, although they do not yet show themselves and are not
reduced to act. Indeed, I am already conscious that my knowledge is
being increased and perfected by degrees; and I see nothing to prevent
it from thus gradually increasing to infinity, nor any reason why, after
such increase and perfection, I should not be able thereby to acquire
all the other perfections of the Divine nature; nor in fine, why the
power I possess of acquiring those perfections, if it really now exist
in me, should not