y, and by doing so
cause his death unintentionally. But you cannot intend the
consequences--though you may have desired them--without intending the
action. The consequences may be intended directly or indirectly, and may
or may not be the only thing intended. The intention is good or bad as
the consequences intended are good or bad.
But these actually depend on the circumstances which are independent of
the intention; here the important point is the man's consciousness of
the circumstances, which are objects not of the will, but of the
understanding. If he is conscious of the circumstances and of their
materiality, the act is advised; if not, unadvised. Unadvisedness may be
due either to heedlessness or to misapprehension. And here we may remark
that we may speak of a bad intention, though the motive was good, if the
consequences intended were bad, and _vice versa_. In this sense also,
the intention may be innocent--that is, not bad, without being
positively good.
Of motives, we are concerned with practical motives only, not those
which are purely speculative. These are either internal or external;
either events _in esse_, or events in prospect. The immediate motive is
an internal motive _in esse_--an awakened pleasure or pain at the
prospect of pleasure or pain. All others are comparatively remote.
Now, since the motive is always primarily to produce some pleasure or
prevent some pain, and since pleasure is identical with good, and pain
with evil, it follows that no motive is in itself bad. The motive is
good if it tends to produce a balance of pleasure; bad, if a balance of
pain. Thus any and every motive may produce actions good, indifferent,
or bad. Hence, in cataloguing motives, we must employ only neutral
terms, _i.e._, not such as are associated with goodness as--piety,
honour--or with badness--as lust, avarice.
The motives, of course, correspond to the various pleasures as
previously enumerated. They may be classified as good, bad, or
indifferent, according as their consequences are more commonly good,
bad, or indifferent; but the dangers of such classification are obvious.
In fact, we cannot affirm goodness, badness, or indifference of motive,
except in the particular instance. A better classification is into the
social--including goodwill, love of reputation, desire of amity,
religion; dissocial--displeasure; self-regarding--physical desire,
pecuniary interest, love of power, self-preservation.
Of a
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