he other, than this
great Jewish genius. Spinoza has been by some nicknamed Pantheist
or Atheist; while Schleiermacher and other theologians have not
hesitated to describe him as "pious, virtuous, God-intoxicated."

_I.--Concerning God_

By God I understand absolutely infinite Being, that is, substance
consisting of infinite attributes, each expressing eternal and definite
essence. If this be denied, conceive, if it be possible, that God does
not exist. Then it follows that His essence does not involve existence,
which is absurd. Therefore God necessarily exists.

God is absolutely the first cause. He acts from the laws of His own
nature only, and is compelled by no one. For outside of Himself there
can be nothing by which He may be determined to act. Therefore He acts
solely from the laws of His own nature. And therefore also God alone is
a free cause.

The omnipotence of God has been actual from eternity and will be actual
from eternity. The Divine intellect is the cause of things, both of
their essence and of their existence. Thus it is the cause both of the
essence and of the existence of the human intellect, but it differs from
our intellect both in essence and in existence. The same may be said of
the Divine will and the human will.

The will cannot be called a free cause, but can only be termed
necessary. The will is only a certain mode of thought, like the
intellect. It requires a cause to determine it to action, and therefore
cannot be called a free cause, but only a necessary cause. Hence it
follows that God does not act from freedom of the will. For the will,
like all other things, needs a cause to determine it to act in a certain
manner. Things could have been produced by God in no other manner or
order than that in which they have been. Things have been created by God
in absolute perfection, because they have necessarily followed from His
absolutely perfect nature.

_The Divine Power and Decree_

Since in eternity there is no _when_, nor _before_, nor _after_, God
cannot decree nor could He have ever decreed anything other than He has
decreed in the perfection of His nature. For if He had decreed something
else about creation, He would necessarily have had an intellect and a
will different from those He now has. Could such a supposition be
allowed, why cannot He now change His decree about creation yet remain
perfect?

All things depend on the Divine power; but God's will, becau