thirty
per cent can be educated so as to be equal to one third of a normal man
each; forty per cent can be made worth two thirds of a man; twenty-five
or thirty per cent pass muster in a crowd. Above these are silly persons
whose relatives shield them from public knowledge. Then above these come
the Dundreary type.[69]

+51. Class; race; group solidarity.+ If the group which is classified is
a large one, and especially if it is a genetic unit (race, tribe, or
nation), there are no gaps in the series. Each individual falls into his
place by virtue of his characteristic differences. Just as no two are
anthropologically alike, so we may believe that no two are alike or
equal in societal value. That all men should be alike or equal, by any
standard whatever, is contrary to all the facts of human nature and all
the conditions of human life. Any group falls into subdivisions, the
members of each of which are approximately equal, when measured by any
standard, because the classification is imperfect. If we make it more
refined, the subdivisions must be subdivided again. We are in a dilemma:
we cannot describe mankind at all without categories, and if we go on to
make our categories more and more exact, each one of them would at last
contain only one person. Two things result which are practically
important, and which furnish us with scientific concepts which we can
employ in further study: (1) The classification gives us the notion of
the relative position of one, or a subdivision, in the entire group.
This is the sense of "class."[70] (2) The characteristic differences
furnish the notion of individuality and personality. The concept of a
race, as the term is now used, is that of a group clustered around a
mean with respect to some characteristic, and great confusion in the use
of the word "race" arises from the attempt to define races by their
boundaries, when we really think of them by the mean or mode, e.g. as to
skin color. The coherence, unity, and solidarity of a genetic group is
a very striking fact. It seems to conceal a play of mystic forces. It
is, in fact, no more mysterious than the run of dice. The propositions
about it would all become, in the last analysis, identical propositions;
e.g. it is most probable that we shall meet with the thing which is
present in the greatest number; or, it is most probable that the most
probable thing will happen. In the middle of the nineteenth century,
when attention was first ca