ceded it, and
that division has continued among Constitutional lawyers and statesmen
to this day. In 1835 Mr. Webster, "after considering the question
again and again," made this declaration in the Senate: "I am willing
to say that, in my deliberate judgment, the original decision was
wrong. I cannot but think that those who denied the power in 1789 had
the best of the argument. It appears to me, after thorough and
repeated and conscientious examination, that an erroneous
interpretation was given to the Constitution in this respect by the
decision of the First Congress. . . . I have the clearest conviction
that the Convention which formed the Constitution looked to no other
mode of displacing an officer than by impeachment or the regular
appointment of another to the same place. . . . I believe it to be
within the just power of Congress to reverse the decision of 1789,
and I mean to hold myself at liberty to act hereafter on that question
as the safety of the Government and of the Constitution may require."
Mr. Webster's words would have exerted a far wider influence upon
public opinion if his argument had not been made under the pressure of
a partisan excitement caused by General Jackson's removal of officers
who were not in sympathy with the measures of his Administration. He
was effectively though not directly answered by the venerable
ex-President Madison. In October, 1834, in a letter to Edward Coles,
Mr. Madison said, "The claim of the Senate on Constitutional ground
to a share in removal as well as appointment of officers is in direct
opposition to the uniform practice of the Government from its
commencement. It is clear that the innovation would not only vary
essentially the existing balance of power, but expose the Executive
occasionally to a total inaction, and at all times to delays fatal to
the due execution of the laws." A year later, and only a few months
before his death, Mr. Madison in a letter to Charles Francis Adams
thus repeated his views: "The claims for the Senate of a share in the
removal from office, and _for the Legislature an authority to regulate
its tenure_, have had powerful advocates. I must still think, however,
that the text of the Constitution is best interpreted by reference to
the tripartite theory of Government, to which practice had conformed,
and which so long and uniform a practice would seem to have
established. The face of the Constitution and the journalized
proceedin
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