en declared in Europe on the 18th of May, 1756. On
one side stood France, Austria, Saxony, Russia, and Sweden; on the
other, Great Britain, Prussia, and a few smaller German states, among
them Hanover and Hesse. Things went as badly here as overseas; for the
meaner kind of party politicians had been long in power, and the Fleet
and Army had both been neglected. There was almost a panic in England
while the French were preparing a joint expedition against Minorca in
the Mediterranean lest this might be turned against England herself.
Minorca was taken, a British fleet having failed to help it. Hawke and
Saunders were then sent to the Mediterranean as a "cargo of courage."
But the fortunes of war could not be changed at once; and they became
even worse next year (1757). The Austrians drove Frederick the Great
out of Bohemia. The French took Hanover. And, though Frederick ended
the year with two victories, Pitt's own first joint expedition failed
to take Rochefort on the west coast of France. Clive's great victory
at Plassey, which laid the foundation of our Indian Empire, was the
only silver lining to the British clouds of war.

But in 1758 Pitt was at last managing the war in his own perfect way;
and everything began to change for the better.

The enemy had already felt the force of British sea-power in three
different ways. They had felt it by losing hundreds of merchant
vessels on the outbreak of war. They had felt it in Hanover, where
they were ready to grant the Hanoverians any terms if the surrender
would only be made before a British fleet should appear on their flank.
And they had felt it during the Rochefort expedition, because, though
that was a wretched failure, they could not tell beforehand when or
where the blow would fall, or whether the fleet and army might not be
only feinting against Rochefort and then going on somewhere else.

There is no end to the advantages a joint fleet and army possesses over
an army alone, even when the army alone has many more men. It is ten
times easier to supply armies with what they need in the way of men,
guns, munitions, food, clothes, and other stores, when these supplies
can be carried by sea. It is ten times easier to keep your movements
secret at sea, where nobody lives and where the weaker sea-power can
never have the best of lookouts, than it is on land, where thousands of
eyes are watching you and thousands of tongues are talking. So, if
your army fight