h you, and to acknowledge my obligations for the
clearer views you have given of truths which I before perceived, though
not with that distinctness in which they now stand before my eyes. But I
could wish this letter to be of some use to you; and that end is more
likely to be attained if I advert to those points in which I think you
are mistaken. These are chiefly such as though very material in
themselves, are not at all so to the main object you have in view, viz.
that of proving that the military power of France may by us be
successfully resisted, and even overthrown. In the first place, then, I
think that there are great errors in the survey of the comparative
strength of the two empires, with which you begin your book, and on
which the first 160 pages are chiefly employed. You seem to wish to
frighten the people into exertion; and in your ardour to attain your
object, that of rousing our countrymen by any means, I think you have
caught far too eagerly at every circumstance with respect to revenue,
navy, &c. that appears to make for the French. This I think was
unnecessary. The people are convinced that the power of France is
dangerous, and that it is our duty to resist it to the utmost. I think
you might have commenced from this acknowledged fact; and, at all
events, I cannot help saying, that the first 100 pages or so of your
book, contrasted with the brilliant prospects towards the conclusion,
have impressed me with a notion that you have written too much under the
influence of feelings similar to those of a poet or novelist, who
deepens the distress in the earlier part of his work, in order that the
happy catastrophe which he has prepared for his hero and heroine may be
more keenly relished. Your object is to conduct us to Elysium, and, lest
we should not be able to enjoy that pure air and purpurial sunshine, you
have taken a peep at Tartarus on the road. Now I am of your mind, that
we ought not to make peace with France, on any account, till she is
humiliated, and her power brought within reasonable bounds. It is our
duty and our interest to be at war with her; but I do not think with
you, that a state of peace would give to France that superiority which
you seem so clearly to foresee. In estimating the resources of the two
empires, as to revenue, you appear to make little or no allowance for
what I deem of prime and paramount importance, the characters of the two
nations, and of the two governments. Was there ev