can be so abject,
so insensible, and unwise, as to abandon the Spaniards and Portugueze
while there is a Patriot in arms; or, if the people should for a time be
subjugated, to deny them assistance the moment they rise to require it
again. I cannot think so unfavourably of my country as to suppose this
possible. Let men in power, however, take care (and let the nation be
equally careful) not to receive any reports from our army--of the
disposition of the Spanish people--without mistrust. The British
generals, who were in Portugal (the whole body of them,[21] according to
the statement of Sir Hew Dalrymple), approved of the Convention of
Cintra; and have thereby shewn that _their_ communications are not to be
relied upon in this case. And indeed there is not any information, which
we can receive upon this subject, that is so little trustworthy as that
which comes from our army--or from any part of it. The opportunities of
notice, afforded to soldiers in actual service, must necessarily be very
limited; and a thousand things stand in the way of their power to make a
right use of these. But a retreating army, in the country of an
Ally;--harrassed and dissatisfied; willing to find a reason for its
failures in any thing but itself, and actually not without much solid
ground for complaint; retreating; sometimes, perhaps, fugitive; and, in
its disorder, tempted (and even forced) to commit offences upon the
people of the district through which it passes; while they, in their
turn, are filled with fear and inconsiderate anger;--an army, in such a
condition, must needs be incapable of seeing objects as they really are;
and, at the same time, all things must change in its presence, and put
on their most unfavourable appearances.

[21] From this number, however, must be excepted the gallant and
patriotic General Ferguson. For that officer has had the virtue publicly
and in the most emphatic manner, upon two occasions, to reprobate the
whole transaction.

Deeming it then not to be doubted that the British government will
continue its endeavours to support its Allies; one or other of two
maxims of policy follows obviously from the painful truths which we have
been considering:--Either, first, that we should put forth to the utmost
our strength as a military power--strain it to the very last point, and
prepare (no erect mind will start at the proposition) to pour into the
Peninsula a force of two hundred thousand men or more,--and ma