mits it to
be. We may argue that in the one case, as in the other, the average
character of the people determines the quality of the control exercised.
In both cases it may be inferred that amelioration of the average
character leads to an amelioration of system; and further, that were it
possible to ameliorate the system without the average character being
first ameliorated, evil rather than good would follow. Such degree of
harshness as children now experience from their parents and teachers,
may be regarded as but a preparation for that greater harshness which
they will meet on entering the world. And it may be urged that were it
possible for parents and teachers to treat them with perfect equity and
entire sympathy, it would but intensify the sufferings which the
selfishness of men must, in after life, inflict on them.[1]
"But does not this prove too much?" some one will ask. "If no system of
moral training can forthwith make children what they should be; if, even
were there a system that would do this, existing parents are too
imperfect to carry it out; and if even could such a system be
successfully carried out, its results would be disastrously incongruous
with the present state of society; does it not follow that to reform the
system now in use is neither practicable nor desirable?" No. It merely
follows that reform in domestic government must go on, _pari passu_,
with other reforms. It merely follows that methods of discipline neither
can be nor should be ameliorated, except by instalments. It merely
follows that the dictates of abstract rectitude will, in practice,
inevitably be subordinated by the present state of human nature--by the
imperfections alike of children, of parents, and of society; and can
only be better fulfilled as the general character becomes better.
"At any rate, then," may rejoin our critic, "it is clearly useless to
set up any ideal standard of family discipline. There can be no
advantage in elaborating and recommending methods that are in advance of
the time." Again we contend for the contrary. Just as in the case of
political government, though pure rectitude may be at present
impracticable, it is requisite to know where the right lies, in order
that the changes we make may be _towards_ the right instead of _away_
from it; so, in the case of domestic government, an ideal must be
upheld, that there may be gradual approximations to it. We need fear no
evil consequences from the maintena
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