seized on an abandoned convent, and fortifying it, prepared to
resist capture. No attempt, however, was made to pursue him, the British
commander contenting himself with the destruction of the privateer. For
nearly a week the British ships were delayed in the harbor, burying their
dead and making repairs. When they reached New Orleans, the army which
they had been sent to reenforce, had met Jackson on the plains of
Chalmette, and had been defeated. The price paid for the "General
Armstrong" was, perhaps, the heaviest of the war. The British commander
seemed to appreciate this fact, for every effort was made to keep the news
of the battle from becoming known in England, and when complete
concealment was no longer possible, an official report was given out that
minimized the British loss, magnified the number of the Americans, and
totally mis-stated the facts bearing on the violation of the neutrality of
the Portuguese port. Captain Reid, however, was made a hero by his
countrymen. A Portuguese ship took him and his crew to Amelia Island,
whence they made their way to New York. Poughkeepsie voted him a sword.
Richmond citizens gave him a complimentary dinner, at which were drunk
such toasts as: "The private cruisers of the United States--whose
intrepidity has pierced the enemy's channels and bearded the lion in his
den"; "Neutral Ports--whenever the tyrants of the ocean dare to invade
these sanctuaries, may they meet with an 'Essex' and an 'Armstrong'"; and
"Captain Reid--his valor has shed a blaze of renown upon the character of
our seamen, and won for himself a laurel of eternal bloom." The
newspapers of the times rang with eulogies of Reid, and anecdotes of his
seafaring experiences. But after all, as McMaster finely says in his
history: "The finest compliment of all was the effort made in England to
keep the details of the battle from the public, and the false report of
the British commander."

In finally estimating the effect upon the American fortunes in the War of
1812, of the privateers and their work, many factors must be taken into
consideration. At first sight it would seem that a system which gave the
services of five hundred ships and their crews to the task of annoying the
British, and inflicting damage upon their commerce without cost to the
American Government, must be wholly advantageous. We have already seen the
losses inflicted upon British commerce by our privateers reflected in the
rapidly increasing