gathering with both hands a mass of undelegated powers, reached that
position which Mr. Jefferson had pointed out as an intolerable evil--the
claim of a right to judge of the extent of its own authority. Of those
then participating in public affairs, it was apparently useless to ask
that the question should be submitted for decision to the parties to the
compact, under the same conditions as those which controlled the
formation and adoption of the Constitution; otherwise, a convention
would have been utterly fruitless, for at that period, when aggression
for sectional aggrandizement had made such rapid advances, it can
scarcely be doubted that more than a fourth, if not a majority of
States, would have adhered to that policy which had been manifested for
years in the legislation of many States, as well as in that of the
Federal Government. What course would then have remained to the Southern
States? Nothing, except either to submit to a continuation of what they
believed and felt to be violations of the compact of union, breaches of
faith, injurious and oppressive usurpation, or else to assert the
sovereign right to reassume the grants they had made, since those grants
had been perverted from their original and proper purposes.

Surely the right to resume the powers delegated and to judge of the
propriety and sufficiency of the causes for doing so are alike
inseparable from the possession of sovereignty. Over sovereigns there is
no common judge, and between them can be no umpire, except by their own
agreement and consent. The necessity or propriety of exercising the
right to withdraw from a confederacy or union must be determined by each
member for itself. Once determined in favor of withdrawal, all that
remains for consideration is the obligation to see that no wanton damage
is done to former associates, and to make such fair settlement of common
interests as the equity of the case may require.

[Footnote 105: "Madison Papers," p. 1006.]

[Footnote 106: Ibid., pp. 1057, 1058.]

[Footnote 107: "Congressional Globe," vol. xiv, p. 299.]

CHAPTER XV.

A Bond of Union necessary after the Declaration of
Independence.--Articles of Confederation.--The Constitution of
the United States.--The Same Principle for obtaining Grants of
Power in both.--The Constitution an Instrument enumerating the
Powers delegated.--The Power of Amendment merely a Power to
amend the Delegated Grants.--A Smaller