ere more potent than
considerations of probable interest. During the anxious period of
uncertainty and apprehension which ensued, the efforts of the Southern
Senators in Washington were employed to dissuade (they could not
_command_) from any aggressive movement, however justifiable, that might
lead to collision. These efforts were exerted through written and
telegraphic communications to the Governors of Alabama and Florida, the
Commander of the Southern troops, and other influential persons near the
scene of operations. The records of the telegraph-office, if preserved,
will no doubt show this to be a very moderate statement of those
efforts. It is believed that by such influence alone a collision was
averted; and it is certain that its exercise gave great dissatisfaction
at the time to some of the ardent advocates of more active measures. It
may be that _they_ were right, and that we, who counseled delay and
forbearance, were wrong. Certainly, if we could have foreseen the
ultimate failure of all efforts for a peaceful settlement, and the
perfidy that was afterward to be practiced in connection with them, our
advice would have been different.

Certain resolutions, said to have been adopted in a meeting of Senators
held on the evening of the 5th of January,[110] have been magnified, by
the representations of artful commentators on the events of the period,
into something vastly momentous.

The significance of these resolutions was the admission that we could
not longer advise delay, and even that was unimportant under the
circumstances, for three of the States concerned had taken final action
on the subject before the resolutions could have been communicated to
them. As an expression of opinion, they merely stated that of which we
had all become convinced by the experience of the previous month--that
our long-cherished hopes had proved illusory--that further efforts in
Congress would be unavailing, and that nothing remained, except that the
States should take the matter into their own hands, as final judges of
their wrongs and of the measure of redress. They recommended the
formation of a confederacy among the seceding States as early as
possible after their secession--advice the expediency of which could
hardly be questioned, either by friend or foe. As to the "instructions"
asked for with regard to the propriety of continuing to hold their
seats, I suppose it must have been caused by some diversity of opinion
whic