ry
the Bithynian pretender Socrates was even put to death by
his orders (664).

The State of Things Intermediate between War and Peace

It was a singular complication. Mithradates was fully convinced
that he could do nothing against the Romans in open conflict, and
was therefore firmly resolved not to allow matters to come to an
open rupture and war with them. Had he not been so resolved, there
was no more favourable opportunity for beginning the struggle than
the present: just at the time when Aquillius marched into Bithynia
and Cappadocia, the Italian insurrection was at the height of its
power and might encourage even the weak to declare against Rome;
yet Mithradates allowed the year 664 to pass without profiting by
the opportunity. Nevertheless he pursued with equal tenacity and
activity his plan of extending his territory in Asia Minor. This
strange combination of a policy of peace at any price with a policy
of conquest was certainly in itself untenable, and was simply a
fresh proof that Mithradates did not belong to the class of genuine
statesmen; he knew neither how to prepare for conflict like king
Philip nor how to submit like king Attalus, but in the true style
of a sultan was perpetually fluctuating between a greedy desire of
conquest and the sense of his own weakness. But even in this point
of view his proceedings can only be understood, when we recollect
that Mithradates had become acquainted by twenty years' experience
with the Roman policy of that day. He knew very well that the Roman
government were far from desirous of war; that they in fact, looking
to the serious danger which threatened their rule from any general
of reputation, and with the fresh remembrance of the Cimbrian war
and Marius, dreaded war still more if possible than he did himself.
He acted accordingly. He was not afraid to demean himself in a way
which would have given to any energetic government not fettered by
selfish considerations manifold ground and occasion for declaring war;
but he carefully avoided any open rupture which would have placed the
senate under the necessity of declaring it. As soon as men appeared
to be in earnest he drew back, before Sulla as well as before
Aquillius; he hoped, doubtless, that he would not always be
confronted by energetic generals, that he too would, as well as
Jugurtha, fall in with his Scaurus or Albinus. It must be owned
that this hope was not without reason; although the very exampl