ssion in
my behalf.

The Sultan is a generous man; I can bear testimony to that. When Russia
and Austria, proudly relying upon their armies and the flush of victory,
arrogantly demanded that we should be surrendered to the hangman of my
fatherland; and when the majority of the Divan (the great Council of
Turkey) taking a shortsighted view of the case, and influenced by the
impending danger, had already consented to the arrogant demand, and
when, in consequence thereof, the abandonment of our religion was
proposed as the only means to save our lives, then the Sultan, informed
of the matter, and following the noble impulse of his generous heart,
declared that he would prefer to perish rather than dishonour his
name--he would therefore accept the dangers of war rather than disregard
the great duty of humanity--thus if he be doomed to perish, he would at
least perish in an honourable way. By that noble resolution our lives
were saved. But European diplomacy stepped in, to convert the accorded
hospitality into a prison;[*] the Sultan being left alone, not
supported, not encouraged by any one soever, but assailed by
complications, ill advised by fear, and threatened by many, yielded at
last, but yielded with the intention to restore us to our natural
rights, as soon as he could be sure that he stood not forsaken and alone
in acknowledging the right of humanity. For a long while, no
encouragement came, and we lingered in our prison, forsaken and without
hope. You, sir, moved a resolution in the Senate of the United States.
In consequence thereof, the great Republic of the West, by its generous
offer, cast a ray of consolation into my prison, and gave encouragement
to the Sublime Porte. The English and the French governments, unwilling
to appear less liberal, both approved the course of the United States.
England made even a similar offer as America, and the Sultan, glad to
see that he was no longer alone in asserting what is right, agreed to
the offer, notwithstanding all the machinations of my enemies, and I and
my countrymen became free.

[Footnote *: I am permitted to explain, that Kossuth had in view not the
action of one power only, but the total result of all the powers. While
the Sultan knew what the arms of Russia were meant for, and could not
learn whether the fleet of England was meant for anything but _a mere
show_ (for Sir Stratford Canning "had no orders" to _use_ it),
the practical advice of diplomacy was, not,