onfine
secession within its natural limits, and to weaken the chances of civil
war, so difficult has it become, at present, to attain the same end.
Painful duties, perhaps, will be imposed on Mr. Lincoln. I wonder, in
truth, at the politicians who advise him to a "masterly inactivity,"
that is, who urge him to continue Mr. Buchanan! Doubtless he does right
to leave to the insurgents all the odium of acting on the offensive, but
his moderation should detract nothing from his firmness, and it is even
of importance that the means of action which he is about to prepare,
should manifest so clearly the overwhelming superiority of the North,
that the resistance of the South will be thereby discouraged.

Adversaries of slavery are not wanting, who are almost indignant at the
adoption of such measures by the new President. Did they fancy then that
a formidable question could be resolved without risking the repression
of the assaults of force by force? Away with childishness! In electing
Mr. Lincoln, it was known that the cotton States were ready to protest
with arms in their hands; he was not elected to receive orders from the
cotton States, or to sign the dissolution of the United States on the
first requisition. Who wills the end, wills the means. No one,
certainly, desires, more than myself, the peaceful repression of the
rebellion. May the success of the blockade render the employment of the
army useless! May the resolute attitude of the Confederation arrest the
majority of the intermediate States on the dangerous declivity upon
which they are standing! Once let them be drawn into the circle of
influence of the extreme South, and little chance will remain of
confining the civil war within the limits beyond which it is so
important that it should not spread.

Then will appear the _irrepressible conflict_ of Mr. Seward. Whether
desired or not, if the two Confederations are placed side by side, the
one representing all the slavery, the other representing all the
liberty, the conflict will take place. It will take place perhaps now,
perhaps a little later; however this may be, no one will have the power
to hinder it. Suppose the South, thus completed, relinquish (and nothing
is less certain) the opening by itself of a war in which it must perish,
and its great plans of attack, against Washington, for instance, be
abandoned; suppose the United States, on their side, avoid a direct
attack, which might give the signal for insurrec