rds his neighbour, in proportion to the malignity of such
expressions.

The reason of things also doth help to explain those words, and to
show why they are prohibited because those harsh terms are needless,
mild words serving as well to express the same things: because they
are commonly unjust, loading men with greater defect or blame than
they can be proved to deserve, or their actions do import; for every
man that speaketh falsehood is not therefore a liar, every man that
erreth is not thence a fool, every man that doeth amiss is not
consequently dishonest or wicked; the secret intentions and habitual
dispositions of men not being always to be collected from their
outward actions; because they are uncharitable, signifying that we
entertain the worst opinions of men, and make the worst construction
of their doings, and are disposed to show them no favour or
kindness: because, also, they produce mischievous effects, such as
spring from the worst passions raised by them.

This in gross is the meaning of the precept. But since there are
some other precepts seeming to clash with this; since there are
cases wherein we are allowed to use the harsher sort of terms, there
are great examples in appearance thwarting this rule; therefore it
may be requisite for determining the limits of our duty, and
distinguishing it from transgression, that such exceptions or
restrictions should be somewhat declared.

1. First, then, we may observe that it may be allowable to persons
in anywise concerned in the prosecution or administration of
justice, to speak words which in private intercourse would be
reproachful. A witness may impeach of crimes hurtful to justice, or
public tranquillity; a judge may challenge, may rebuke, may condemn
an offender in proper terms (or forms of speech prescribed by law),
although most disgraceful and distasteful to the guilty: for it
belongeth to the majesty of public justice to be bold, blunt,
severe; little regarding the concerns or passions of particular
persons, in comparison to the public welfare.

A testimony, therefore, or sentence against a criminal, which
materially is a reproach, and morally would be such in a private
mouth, is not yet formally so according to the intent of this rule.
For practices of this kind, which serve the exigencies of justice,
are not to be interpreted as proceeding from anger, hatred, revenge,
any bad passion or humour; but in way