herwise to speak ill of him, no private man hath just right or
authority, and therefore, in presuming to do it, he is disorderly
and irregular, trespassing beyond his bounds, usurping an undue
power to himself.

2. We should never speak ill of any man without apparent just
cause. It must be just; we must not reproach men for things
innocent or indifferent; for not concurring in disputable opinions
with us, for not complying with our humour, for not serving our
interest, for not doing anything to which they are not obliged, or
for using their liberty in any case: it must be at least some
considerable fault, which we can so much as tax. It must also be
clear and certain, notorious and palpable; for to speak ill upon
slender conjectures, or doubtful suspicions, is full of iniquity.
"[Greek], "They rail at things which they know not," is part of
those wicked men's character, whom St. Jude doth so severely
reprehend. If, indeed, these conditions being wanting, we presume
to reproach any man, we do therein no less than slander him; which
to do is unlawful in any case, is in truth a most diabolical and
detestable crime. To impose odious names and characters on any
person, which he deserveth not, or without ground of truth, is to
play the devil; and hell itself scarce will own a fouler practice.

3. We should not cast reproach upon any man without some necessary
reason. In charity (that charity which "covereth all sins," which
"covereth a multitude of sins") we are bound to connive at the
defects, and to conceal the faults of our brethren; to extenuate and
excuse them, when apparent, so far as we may in truth and equity.
We must not therefore ever produce them to light, or prosecute them
with severity, except very needful occasion urgeth--such as is the
glory and service of God, the maintenance of truth, the vindication
of innocence, the preservation of public justice and peace; the
amendment of our neighbour himself, or securing others from
contagion. Barring such reasons (really being, not affectedly
pretended), we are bound not so much as to disclose, as to touch our
neighbour's faults; much more, not to blaze them about, not to
exaggerate them by vehement invectives.

4. We should never speak ill of any man beyond measure; be the
cause never so just, the occasion never so necessary, we should yet
nowise be immoderate therein, exceeding the bounds prescribed by
truth, equity