cause no man can judge concerning the truth of such
accusations, because no man can exempt or defend himself from them:
so that apparently such practice doth thwart all course of justice
and equity.
4. Another kind is, perverting a man's words or actions
disadvantageously by affected misconstruction. All words are
ambiguous, and capable of different senses, some fair, some more
foul; all actions have two handles, one that candour and charity
will, another that disingenuity and spite may lay hold on; and in
such cases to misapprehend is a calumnious procedure, arguing
malignant disposition and mischievous design. Thus when two men did
witness that our Lord affirmed, He "could demolish the temple, and
rear it again in three days"--although He did indeed speak words to
that purpose, meaning them in a figurative sense, discernible enough
to those who would candidly have minded His drift and way of
speaking--yet they who crudely alleged them against Him are called
false witnesses. "At last," saith the Gospel, "came two false
witnesses, and said, This fellow said, I am able to destroy the
temple," etc. Thus also when some certified of St. Stephen, as
having said that "Jesus of Nazareth should destroy that place, and
change the customs that Moses delivered;" although probably he did
speak words near to that purpose, yet are those men called false
witnesses: "And," saith St. Luke, "they set up false witnesses,
which said, This man ceaseth not to speak blasphemous words," etc.
Which instances plainly do show, if we would avoid the guilt of
slander, how careful we should be to interpret fairly and favourably
the words and the actions of our neighbour.
5. Another sort of this practice is, partial and lame
representation of men's discourse, or their practice; suppressing
some part of the truth in them, or concealing some circumstances
about them which might serve to explain, to excuse, or to extenuate
them. In such a manner easily, without uttering any logical
untruth, one may yet grievously calumniate. Thus suppose a man
speaketh a thing upon supposition, or with exception, or in way of
objection, or merely for disputation sake, in order to the
discussion or clearing of truth; he that should report him asserting
it absolutely, unlimitedly, positively and peremptorily, as his own
settled judgment, would notoriously calumniate. If one should be
inveigled by fraud, or driven by vio
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