, or any other great principle," I hold,
as the reader will see if his patience lasts to the end of the
volume, with as much persistence as any man. But I must altogether
take exception to the statement, which is the central point of the
argument just stated, namely, that the fact that these principles
work in practice is _any ground for believing them to be even
approximately true_' (p. 145).

Our patience may easily stand the suggested test, since Mr. Balfour's
book is for the most part extremely well written; and unless I have
totally misunderstood him, his conclusions are (_a_) that he and we do
well to accept the general body of accepted scientific doctrines,
including those of the theory of evolution and the uniformity of nature,
without _any ground for believing them to be even approximately true_;
and (_b_) that he and his co-believers do equally well to hold what he
vaguely indicates (p. 324) as 'the Theological opinions to which I
adhere,' _also_ without 'any ground for believing them to be even
approximately true.' In a sentence (p. 320) of which the diction is
noticeably lax, he says:--

'...I and an indefinite number of other persons, if we contemplate
Religion and Science as unproved systems of belief standing side by
side, _feel a practical need for both_; and if this need is, in the
case of those few and fragmentary scientific truths by which we
regulate our animal actions, or an especially imperious and
indestructible character--on the other hand, _the need for
religious truth, rooted as it is in the loftiest region of our
moral nature_, is one from which we would not, if we could, be
freed.... _We are in this matter_,' he adds, '_unfortunately
altogether outside the sphere of Reason_.'

FOOTNOTES:

[8] This is the elucidation of the puzzling phrase, 'the exception
proves the rule,' so often fallaciously used. It comes from the Latin
schoolmen's 'Exceptio _probat_ regulam,' where the meaning is patent
enough.

[9] _Defence of Philosophic Doubt_, p. 13.

[10] Compare Professor Royce:--'Our intelligent ideas of things never
consist of mere images of things, but always involve a consciousness of
how we propose to act towards the things of which we have ideas'
(_Gifford Lectures_, 1900, i. 22).

[11] I exclude the possibility that 'experience' might be construed to
mean the entire development of the mind from infa