It is quite needless
to trace the history of it in human experience, for it is clearly
pre-human. If from a tree you fire at and wound a tiger who sees you, he
will try to get at you, plainly regarding you as the cause of his wound,
though he may never have been shot or seen a shot fired before. The
accuracy of his inference is worth noting, though he might chance, of
course, to have been wounded by a shot fired by an unseen companion of
yours. It may 'reasonably' be 'inferred' (to use terms which Mr. Balfour
would probably censure), that man has always obeyed the law of _thought_
thus illustrated; and no number of wrong particular inferences can
affect the inevitableness of his assumption that any event has a cause.
The _concept_ of cause roots in primary animal habit.
Is this assumption, then, a 'law of phenomena' in Mr. Balfour's sense?
is it to be ruled out, on his principles, as not being founded on
observation and experiment? and are men of science thereby shown to be
wrong in holding that every scientific statement of the laws of
phenomena is so founded? I do not see how he can thus argue; for he has
expressly contended (p. 135), that 'A law of nature refers to a fixed
relation, _not_ between the totality of phenomena, but between extremely
small portions of that totality.' Is a law of phenomena, then, something
other than a law of nature? This he cannot mean; and the conclusion is
that the so-called 'law of universal causation' is not properly to be
called a law of nature, or a law at all, unless we are so to call a
necessary element of all reflection upon nature.
The dispute here, in short, resolves itself into a question of
terminology; and it is quite likely that many men of science, and many
freethinkers, have used lax terminology. But as regards the
reasonableness of their beliefs, or their way of believing, in contrast
with those of the supernaturalists whom Mr. Balfour champions, he has
thus far made out no hostile case whatever. And when we come to what
appear to be his conclusions, they are such as can wring no
rationalist's withers. Our ultimate premisses, he contends, are
incapable of proof. Granted--if the assumption of universal causation is
to be termed a premiss, as is that of the uniformity of nature. The
practical issue for him appears to be contained in this passage (italics
ours):--
'That men ought not to give up on speculative grounds the belief in
"the uniformity of nature
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