icist, looks for them in terms of
speculative psychics.

Upon a strictly impartial and 'objective' consideration, the two kinds
of bias are seen to be alike forms of craving, desires seeking
satisfaction. Both inquirers seek for 'causes.' But one has the habit of
seeking causes in terms of sequences of known or intelligible processes,
capable of willed repetition; the other yearns to find proof of the
existence of non-material personalities in the cosmos and in his
personal neighbourhood, and, believing in such existence in advance,
either provisionally or rootedly, hopes to bring others to his way of
thinking by a demonstration that certain physical phenomena are not
physically producible. And it must be granted him that herein he is
theoretically at par with the man of science--physical or moral--who,
having spontaneously framed a hypothesis, seeks to find that facts
conform to it. Every man with a hypothesis, broadly speaking, wants to
find that facts are so-and-so.

The rationalist, then, has his bias like another. Though it takes in
part a critical or negative form, it is fundamentally as positive as
another. He has come to crave for coherence and consistency in
narratives, statements, explanations, arguments, propositions, and
systems of thought; even as his 'contrary' or competitor has come to
crave for evidence that something 'supernatural' wields a purposive and
'intelligent' control, mediate or immediate, over all things, using
among others 'supernormal' means. This 'contrary' thinker may or may not
believe in 'spirits' in the ordinary sense, may or may not believe in
the immortality of human minds; but if he is really to be an opponent of
the rationalist bias he is to be classed as having a bias to traditional
or authoritative views of the cosmos, to religious as against
naturalistic explanations of history, to a conception of the human as of
the extra-human processes in terms of a controlling will and purpose. He
too, it is true, must have some craving for coherence and
consistency--else he could not debate and reason at all; but the other
craving in him has primed that.

It is a fallacy, we may note in passing, to suppose that the 'agnostic'
attitude, so-called, is something between the two main forms of bias
here posited. Agnosticism, logically carried out, can differentiate from
other forms of rationalism only in local limitation of belief; and in
practice it is not often found to do even that. The agn