g supposed lawful, is without all controversy obligatory. Now the
reverend brother doth acknowledge both the covenant itself to be a lawful
oath, and that which the covenant supposeth, namely, a church government
distinct from the civil government, and yet not merely doctrinal, to be a
lawful thing; for he professeth to yield it (though not _jure divino_,
yet) in prudence, which he cannot do, if he make the thing unlawful. 3.
That which an oath doth suppose is sometimes supposed _vi materiae_, or
_consequentiae_, that is, the words of the oath do necessarily imply such a
thing, though it be not intended by the swearer; and here I will tell Mr
Coleman one story of Alexander for another: When Alexander was coming
against a town to destroy it, he met Anaximenes, who, as he understood,
came to make intercession and supplication for sparing the town. Alexander
prevented him with an oath that he would not do that thing which
Anaximenes should make petition for, whereupon Anaximenes made petition
that he would destroy the town. Alexander found himself bound by the plain
words of his oath not to do what he intended, and so did forbear. And to
add a divine story to an human, Joshua and the princes of Israel did swear
to the Gibeonites upon a supposition that was not true, yet they found
themselves tied by their oath. So he that sweareth to his own hurt must
not change, the oath being otherwise lawful, Psal. xv. 4, yet that
self-hurt which is wrapped up in the matter of his oath was not intended
in swearing. Sometimes, again, that which is supposed and implied in an
oath, lieth also in the thoughts and intentions of those that swear. Now,
where those two are coincident, that is, where the thing supposed in an
oath is both implied necessarily in the words of the oath, and is also
according to the apprehensions of those that swear (which is the case here
in the covenant, and is acknowledged by the reverend brother), I should
think it most strange how any divine can have the least doubt concerning
the obligation of such a thing, except he conceive the thing itself to be
unlawful.

His second answer is this: "In my way (saith he) the governments, civil
and ecclesiastical, are in the subject matter clearly distinct. When the
Parliament handles matters of war, it is a military court; when business
of state, it is a civil court; when matters of religion, it is an
ecclesiastical court." If this hold good, then it will follow, 1. That the