invidious suggestions. The action of those who opposed the war,
whatever may have been their motives, was outwardly consistent enough,
and the construction placed upon it by M. Ollivier may seem rather
subtle and far-fetched. At the present day, however, this question
does not particularly concern any one, though we may agree that at
that moment no one in France contemplated the possibility of defeat in
the field. The French army was assumed by all parties to be
invincible, and the minority in opposition did undoubtedly believe and
fear that the empire would be consolidated by victories. M. Thiers in
his speech only touched generally upon the chances and perils of war,
and even Gambetta voted with the Government upon the conviction that
success was beyond doubt; while not only in Paris, but in all the
great towns, the determination to fight was acclaimed because a
triumphant campaign was supposed to be certain. It was to be
anticipated, indeed, that a brave and high-spirited nation, very
sensitive on the point of honour, and confident in its military
superiority, would respond enthusiastically to the signal of war
against a rival whose ill-will was notorious, who was accused of
plotting the injury of their country and of deliberately insulting
their Government.

A public declaration of hostilities was sent to Berlin, though M.
Ollivier tells us that his ministry regarded it as a superfluous
formality which they would have preferred leaving to Prussia.

'La declaration fut libellee d'une maniere assez maladroite par les
commis des Affaires etrangeres, et elle ne fut pas meme lue au
Conseil. Elle fut communiquee uniquement par la forme et sans
discussion aux Assemblees, et envoyee a la Prusse le 19 juillet.'

This perfunctory method of composition is characteristic of the
prevailing official atmosphere.

The document was delivered by the French charge d'affaires to
Bismarck, and in the dialogue that followed between the two
diplomatists, which M. Ollivier relates in full, we have an excellent
sample of the Prussian Chancellor's sardonic and incisive manner.
Bismarck asserted that if he had been present at the interviews with
Benedetti he might have prevented the war, whereas the king's
conciliatory tone at Ems had misled the French ministers into the
blunder of using threats and making intolerable demands, until at last
they found themselves confronted by a strong Government, backed by the
Pruss