and no
solid support in the Chamber. The emperor presided at the meetings of
the Cabinet; and it is clear that the ultimate decision in the
supremely important departments of the army and of foreign affairs was
still reserved to the sovereign, on whom the Foreign Secretary (as we
should call him) could urge his views separately, and from whom he
could take orders independently of the first minister. In this
radically false position M. Ollivier found himself committed to
measures on which he had not been consulted, and hurried into
dangerous courses of action for which he had no recognised official
responsibility, since they were sanctioned by the emperor's
unquestionable authority. We have to remember, also, that in July
1870, liberal institutions had been no more than six months under
trial after eighteen years of autocratic rule, that the advocates of
the old _regime_ were numerous and openly hostile to the reforms, and
that all the ministers of the new _regime_ lacked experience in the
art and practice of constitutional administration. It is among those
conditions and circumstances that we must find some explanation of
their imprudence, and of their inability to make a stand against the
emperor's weakness, the clamour of hot-headed deputies, and the
war-cries of journalists; some excuse, in short, for the heedlessness
with which a well-meaning ministry stepped into the snare that had
been laid for them.

When, in 1871, the ex-emperor was told of M. Ollivier's earnest
protest against the cruel injustice of holding him alone answerable
for the national disasters, Napoleon is reported to have replied that
this responsibility must be shared by the ministry, the Chamber, and
himself.

'Si je n'avais pas voulu la guerre, j'aurais renvoye mes ministres;
si l'opposition etait venue d'eux, ils auraient donne leur
demission; enfin, si la Chambre avait ete contraire a l'entreprise,
elle eut vote contre.'[53]

In a broad and general sense this conclusion may be accepted, for all
parties concerned were heavily to blame; and manifestly the disasters
were the outcome of a situation in which weakness and rashness were
matched against unscrupulous statecraft and the deep-laid combinations
of a consummate strategist.

FOOTNOTES:

[41] _L'Empire Liberal: Etudes, Recits, Souvenirs._ Par Emile
Ollivier. Vol. xiv.: La Guerre. 1909.--_Edinburgh Review_, January
1910.

[42] 'Animo retto e buono' (_Memorie_, p.