z un argument pour etablir vos intentions
pacifiques.'[49]

And he at once drafted a telegram instructing Benedetti to require
from the king no more than that he should agree not to permit Leopold
to retract the particular renunciation which his father had obtained
from him; instead of requiring a general assurance against _any
future_ retractation. Gramont telegraphed accordingly, but in
continuation, not in correction, of his earlier message, so that the
latter part of the instructions to Benedetti was inconsistent with the
former part. But this second telegram reached Ems, as M. Ollivier had
foreseen, too late, for Benedetti had already seen the king, and had
been urging him persistently to satisfy the French Government by
conceding the general assurance.

M. Ollivier's description of the distress and perplexity that kept him
without sleep during the rest of that eventful night will be read with
a feeling of sincere commiseration. This, then, he reflected, was the
first fruit of imperial liberalism, that the chief minister was
slighted by his sovereign, ill-served and even betrayed by his
colleagues, and committed, behind his back, to a most hazardous
policy. He had been too soft-hearted to insist on making a clean sweep
of the old official class in forming his Cabinet; he had thought to
replace the decrepit absolutism by a young and liberal empire; and
here was the personal power reappearing at the first crisis. The idea
of having given the signal for war was abhorrent to him; he felt
violently tempted to resign and retire. Yet, on reflection, to tender
his resignation at such a moment would be, he felt, an act of culpable
egoism, it would inevitably bring on the war; for the government would
pass into the hands of a rash and impetuous war-party, manifestly bent
on marching against Prussia if the king persisted in refusing, as on
hearing of Ollivier's resignation he would assuredly refuse, the
guarantees that had been demanded by the Council held at St. Cloud. On
the other hand, by remaining in the ministry he might still command a
majority in the Cabinet; nor did he despair of a majority in the
Chamber to support him in cancelling, at some future stage of the
negotiations, this demand for guarantees if he could recover the
emperor's confidence. He might fail, but then he would fall
honourably, having subordinated personal susceptibilities to
considerations of his country's interest; so he finally determined