hat side of the river to make it an object for Beauregard to
destroy or capture them, and when Buel's advance had approached within
twenty to twenty-five miles of Savannah, that Beauregard determined upon
an attack, and declared he would crush or capture the troops on that
side, and water his horse in the Tennessee river that night, and that
but for the timely arrival by forced marches of Buel's advance of two
divisions on the field about four o'clock that afternoon, he would
undoubtedly have executed his purpose. If Buel had been guilty of such
blundering (not to call it by any worse name than this) it would have
been impossible to make the country at the North believe that he did not
meditate its destruction. For this blunder Grant was promptly relieved
of his command, by the proper authorities, and it was many years
afterwards, before anyone was found, who did not think this was very
moderate punishment, under such circumstances. The fault in the case
under consideration differs in kind, but not in its disastrous effects
upon our cause and our army.

The right of our army at Murfreesboro, judging from what happened (and
as I said at the outset, when I don't know personally what happened, I
speak from necessary inference) seemed to think that inasmuch as our
plan of battle contemplated an attack by the extreme left, to be
followed up by them subsequently during the day, that they had nothing
to do at that early hour in the morning, but to keep a picket force out,
send their artillery horses to a distant point for water, stack their
arms, and get breakfast. They did not seem to think possibly Bragg might
have plans of his own, and that our attack might be anticipated, and
that our right might receive a desperate attack while our left was
preparing to deliver one. This, as you all know, was what happened, and
you all know its disastrous results.

Current reports at the time were to the effect that the right was found
when the attack came upon them in the condition already described, and
the prompt manner in which they were hurled from the field, corroborates
this view of the case. This, of course, caused the troops to their left
to be immediately out-flanked, and no resistance, to amount to anything,
from that portion of our line could be expected under such
circumstances. How much Gen. Rosecrans and his staff are properly to
blame for the state of things existing on the right at the time of the
attack, I have no means