lan was well conceived, and might have worked well enough perhaps,
if the enemy had waited for us. The same mistake (or a similar one
rather) was made here that was made by Grant at Shiloh, only the latter
was much more faulty. In that case Grant was moving his army up the
Tennessee River to Savannah, the object being to attack Beauregard, then
at Corinth, some twenty miles from Savannah, as soon as he should have
made a junction with Buell's army, then at Nashville, Tenn., and which
was to march from that place to Savannah. Grant's army proceeding by
boats, arrived at Savannah by detachments first, and should have all
been landed on the side of the river toward Grant's reinforcements,
instead of on the side toward the enemy--unless he considered from the
time he landed, anything more than a picket force of cavalry to keep him
advised of the enemy's movements on the side toward them--that he had
enough to successfully cope with him. If he thought the latter, he
should have been with his troops on the side of the river toward the
enemy instead of eight miles below on the other side. Thus the most
elementary principles of grand tactics and military science, that, in
case two armies are endeavoring to concentrate with a view of delivering
an attack on a superior force of the enemy, the inferior force nearest
the enemy, should be careful to oppose all natural obstructions, such as
rivers, mountains, heavy forests, impassable marshes, between it and the
enemy until a junction can be made. In this case the detachments of
Grant's army were allowed to land on the side toward the enemy, select
their locations as best they could without instructions or concert of
action of any kind, and this within fifteen to eighteen miles of the
enemy in force, in the enemy's country, where it was known to all that
he had daily and hourly opportunity from the citizens who fell back
before our forces, to find out all the time the exact locations and
strength of Grant's and Buel's armies, respectively. Under circumstances
like these, the merest tyro in military knowledge ought to have known
that an experienced, able officer, such as Beauregard was known to be,
would not wait for the concentration, before anticipating the attack. So
it was no surprise to any one except the troops on that side the river
towards Corinth, and possibly to Grant, then at Savannah, that on that
fatal Sunday morning in April, 1862, when Grant had got sufficient
troops on t