d
his into three grand divisions called the Right, Center, and Left, and
each of these into three ordinary divisions of four brigades each, the
Right, Center and Left commanded respectively by Generals A. McD.
McCook, George H. Thomas and Thos. L. Crittenden.

At the time of this advance and for a long time previous thereto, I was
commanding a brigade in Gen. Thos. J. Wood's division of the left wing.
The advance movement all along the line finally commenced about the 26th
day of December, 1862. The first day Palmer's division of the left wing
had the advance and on the evening of that day, had reached the vicinity
of Lavergne, having had some pretty sharp skirmishing in so doing. The
next day by rotation Wood's division had the advance.

It was not the place of my brigade to lead the division that day, but I
was specially requested to take the advance, however, as the progress
made the day before had not been satisfactory. I consented to do so upon
condition that the cavalry, which had been in advance the day before
should be retired to the rear of my brigade ready to be brought into use
should we succeed in routing the enemy, and should the topography of the
country admit of the successful use of cavalry. I had seen so many
disastrous results ensue from the use of squadrons of cavalry in advance
of an army under such circumstances as we were advancing, that I did not
want to run any such risks in addition to the ordinary and inevitable
risks of such advances against an army in the field. The cavalry
necessarily has to retire before any effective work can be done, and
usually comes back pell mell with a lot of riderless horses, and creates
infinitely more confusion, consternation, and even danger to the
advancing army, than anything the enemy would be likely to do at that
stage of the operations.

Having thus arrived at the front and got the cavalry out of the way to
the rear, I found the enemy securely lodged in the town of Lavergne, and
masked from our view by the buildings, shrubbery and fences. My orders
contemplated an immediate advance along the main pike toward
Murfreesboro. Thus no opportunity was given for flanking them, and so
compelling them to abandon the town. The country was open between my
command and the town, and afforded no shelter whatever for the troops. I
formed the brigade in two lines about 200 yards apart, with a strong
line of skirmishers about the same distance in advance of the first
line,