drawn to the aid of the army in Pennsylvania. But it was feared that,
before these reinforcements could arrive, Sir William Howe would gain
possession of the forts, and remove the obstructions to the navigation
of the Delaware. This apprehension furnished a strong motive for
vigorous attempts to relieve fort Mifflin. But the relative force of
the armies, the difficulty of acting offensively against Philadelphia,
and, above all, the reflection that a defeat might disable him from
meeting his enemy in the field even after the arrival of the troops
expected from the north, determined General Washington not to hazard a
second attack under existing circumstances.
To expedite the reinforcements for which he waited, Colonel Hamilton
was despatched to General Gates with directions to represent to him
the condition of the armies in Pennsylvania; and to urge him, if he
contemplated no other service of more importance, immediately to send
the regiments of Massachusetts and New Hampshire to aid the army of
the middle department. These orders were not peremptory, because it
was possible that some other object (as the capture of New York) still
more interesting than the expulsion of General Howe from Philadelphia,
might be contemplated by Gates; and Washington meant not to interfere
with the accomplishment of such object.
On reaching General Putnam, Colonel Hamilton found that a considerable
part of the northern army had joined that officer, but that Gates had
detained four brigades at Albany for an expedition intended to be made
in the winter against Ticonderoga.
Having made such arrangements with Putnam as he supposed would secure
the immediate march of a large body of continental troops from that
station, Colonel Hamilton proceeded to Albany for the purpose of
remonstrating to General Gates against retaining so large and valuable
a part of the army unemployed at a time when the most imminent danger
threatened the vitals of the country. Gates was by no means disposed
to part with his troops. He could not believe that an expedition then
preparing at New York, was designed to reinforce General Howe; and
insisted that, should the troops then embarked at that place, instead
of proceeding to the Delaware, make a sudden movement up the Hudson,
it would be in their power, should Albany be left defenceless, to
destroy the valuable arsenal which had been there erected, and the
military stores captured with Burgoyne, which had been chie
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