. He
was also indefatigable in driving the live stock out of the way, and
in bringing from fort George to fort Edward, the ammunition and other
military stores which had been deposited at that place. Still farther
to delay the movements of the British, he posted Colonel Warner on
their left flank, with instructions to raise the militia in that
quarter. The hope was entertained, that the appearance of a
respectable force, threatening the flank and rear of the invading
army, would not only retard its advance, but would induce General
Burgoyne to weaken it, in order to strengthen the garrison of
Ticonderoga.
While thus endeavoring to obstruct the march of the enemy, Schuyler
was not less attentive to the best means of strengthening his own
army. Reinforcements of regular troops were earnestly solicited; the
militia of New England and New York were required to take the field,
and all his influence in the surrounding country was exerted to
reanimate the people, and to prevent their defection from the American
cause.
[Sidenote: Proclamation of Burgoyne and counter-proclamation of
Schuyler.]
While at Skeensborough General Burgoyne issued a second
proclamation[78] summoning the people of the adjacent country to send
ten deputies from each township to meet Colonel Skeene at Castletown,
in order to deliberate on such measures as might still be adopted to
save those who had not yet conformed to his first, and submitted to
the royal authority. General Schuyler apprehending some effect from
this paper, issued a counter proclamation, stating the insidious
designs of the enemy. Warning the inhabitants, by the example of
Jersey, of the danger to which their yielding to this seductive
proposition would expose them, and giving them the most solemn
assurances that all who should send deputies to this meeting, or in
any manner aid the enemy, would be considered traitors, and should
suffer the utmost rigour of the law.
[Footnote 78: Remem.]
The evacuation of Ticonderoga was a shock for which no part of the
United States was prepared. Neither the strength of the invading army,
nor of the garrison had been understood. When therefore intelligence
was received that a place, on the fortifications of which much money
and labour had been expended, which was considered as the key to the
whole northwestern country, and supposed to contain a garrison nearly
equal to the invading army, had been abandoned without a siege; that
an imm
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