ed his plan of bringing Washington to
another battle; and, thinking it adviseable, perhaps, to transfer the
seat of war to the neighbourhood of his ships, determined to cross the
Schuylkill, and take possession of Philadelphia. In the afternoon, he
ordered one detachment to cross at Fatland ford which was on his
right, and another to cross at Gordon's ford, on his left, and to take
possession of the heights commanding them. These orders were executed
without much difficulty, and the American troops placed to defend
these fords were easily dispersed.

This service being effected, the whole army marched by its right,
about midnight, and crossing at Fatland without opposition, proceeded
a considerable distance towards Philadelphia, and encamped, with its
left near Sweed's ford, and its right on the Manatawny road, having
Stony run in its front.

It was now apparent that only immediate victory could save
Philadelphia from the grasp of the British general, whose situation
gave him the option of either taking possession of that place, or
endeavouring to bring on another engagement. If, therefore, a battle
must certainly be risked to save the capital, it would be necessary to
attack the enemy.

Public opinion, which a military chief finds too much difficulty in
resisting, and the opinion of congress required a battle; but, on a
temperate consideration of circumstances, Washington came to the wise
decision of avoiding one for the present.

His reasons for this decision were conclusive. Wayne and Smallwood had
not yet joined the army. The continental troops ordered from
Peekskill, who had been detained for a time by an incursion from New
York, were approaching; and a reinforcement of Jersey militia, under
General Dickenson, was also expected.

To these powerful motives against risking an engagement, other
considerations of great weight were added, founded on the condition of
his soldiers. An army, manoeuvring in an open country, in the face of
a very superior enemy, is unavoidably exposed to excessive fatigue,
and extreme hardship. The effect of these hardships was much increased
by the privations under which the American troops suffered. While in
almost continual motion, wading deep rivers, and encountering every
vicissitude of the seasons, they were without tents, nearly without
shoes, or winter clothes, and often without food.

A council of war concurred in the opinion the Commander-in-chief had
formed, not to march a