, and
that the oral monosyllable _five_ is the same number, in an other form; but
is still as much at a loss for a proper answer to his question, as if he
had never seen either schoolmaster or dictionary. So is it with a vast
number of the simplest things in grammar.

7. Since what we denominate scientific terms, are seldom, if ever, such as
stand for ideas simple and undefinable; and since many of those which
represent general ideas, or classes of objects, may be made to stand for
more or fewer things, according to the author's notion of classification;
it is sufficiently manifest that the only process by which instruction can
effectually reach the understanding of the pupil and remove the
difficulties spoken of, is that of delivering accurate definitions. These
are requisite for the information and direction of the learner; and these
must be thoroughly impressed upon his mind, as the only means by which he
can know exactly how much and what he is to understand by our words. The
power which we possess, of making known all our complex or general ideas of
things by means of definitions, is a faculty wisely contrived in the nature
of language, for the increase and spread of science; and, in the hands of
the skillful, it is of vast avail to these ends. It is "the first and
highest philosophy," instructing mankind, to think clearly and speak
accurately; as well as to know definitely, in the unity and permanence of a
general nature, those things which never could be known or spoken of as the
individuals of an infinite and fleeting multitude.

8. And, without contradiction, the shortest and most successful way of
teaching the young mind to distinguish things according to their proper
differences, and to name or describe them aright, is, to tell in direct
terms what they severally are. Cicero intimates that all instruction
appealing to reason ought to proceed in this manner: "Omnis enim quse a
ratione suscipitur de re aliqua institutio, debet a _definitione_
proficisci, ut intelligatur quid sit id, de quo disputetur."--_Off_. Lib.
i, p. 4. Literally thus: "For all instruction which from reason is
undertaken concerning any thing, ought to proceed from a _definition_, that
it may be understood what the thing is, about which the speaker is
arguing." Little advantage, however, will be derived from any definition,
which is not, as Quintilian would have it, "Lucida et succincta rei
descriptio,"--"a clear and brief description of the