social transmission of thought, and the elevation of
national character. From this, it may be laid down as a broad principle,
that no individual can make great advances in intellectual improvement,
beyond the bounds of a ready-formed language, as the necessary means of his
progress."--_Ib._, p. 9. These positions might easily be offset by contrary
speculations of minds of equal rank; but I submit them to the reader, with
the single suggestion, that the author is not remarkable for that sobriety
of judgement which gives weight to opinions.

6. We have seen, among the citations in a former chapter, that Sanctius
says, "Names are the signs, and as it were _the instruments, of things_."
But what he meant by "_instrumenta rerum_" is not very apparent. Dr. Adam
says, "The principles of grammar may be traced from the progress of the
mind in the acquisition of language. Children first express their feelings
by motions and gestures of the body, by cries and tears. _This is_[31] the
language of nature, and therefore universal. _It fitly represents_[32] the
quickness of sentiment and thought, which are as instantaneous as the
impression of light on the eye. Hence we always express our stronger
feelings by these natural signs. But when we want to make known to others
the particular conceptions of the mind, we must represent them by parts, we
must divide and analyze them. We express _each part by certain signs_,[33]
and join these together, according to the order of their relations. Thus
words are _both the instrument and signs[34] the division_ of
thought."--_Preface to Latin Gram._

7. The utterance of words, or the making of signs of any sort, requires
time;[35] but it is here suggested by Dr. Adam, that sentiment and thought,
though susceptible of being retained or recalled, naturally flash upon the
mind with immeasurable quickness.[36] If so, they must originate in
something more spiritual than language. The Doctor does not affirm that
words are the instruments of thought, but of _the division_ of thought. But
it is manifest, that if they effect this, they are not the only instruments
by means of which the same thing may be done. The deaf and dumb, though
uninstructed and utterly ignorant of language, can think; and can, by rude
signs of their own inventing, manifest a similar division, corresponding to
the individuality of things. And what else can be meant by "_the division
of thought_," than our notion of objects, as existing