wills, the signs of knowledge
are knowledge; and words, when he gives the ability to understand them,
may, in some sense, become--"spirit and life." See _John_, vi, 63. Where
competent intellectual faculties exist, the intelligible signs of thought
do move the mind to think; and to think sometimes with deep feelings too,
whether of assent or dissent, of admiration or contempt. So wonderful a
thing is a rational soul, that it is hard to say to what ends the language
in which it speaks, may, or may not, be sufficient. Let experience
determine. We are often unable to excite in others the sentiments which we
would: words succeed or fail, as they are received or resisted. But let a
scornful expression be addressed to a passionate man, will not the words
"call internal feelings" into action? And how do feelings differ from
thoughts?[29] Hear Dr. James Rush: "The human mind is the place of
representation of all the existences of nature which are brought within the
scope of the senses. The representatives are called ideas. These ideas are
the simple passive pictures of things, or [else] they exist with an
activity, capable of so affecting the physical organs as to induce us to
seek the continuance of that which produces them, or to avoid it. This
active or vivid class of ideas comprehends the passions. The functions of
the mind here described, exist then in different forms and degrees, from
the simple idea, to the highest energy of passion: and the terms, thought,
sentiment, emotion, feeling, and passion, are but the verbal signs of these
degrees and forms. Nor does there appear to be any line of classification,
for separating thought from passion: since simple thoughts, without
changing their nature, do, from interest or incitement, often assume the
colour of passion."--_Philosophy of the Human Voice_, p. 328.

4. Lord Kames, in the Appendix to his Elements of Criticism, divides _the
senses_ into external and internal, defining _perception_ to be the act by
which through the former we know outward objects, and _consciousness_ the
act by which through the latter we know what is within the mind. An _idea_,
according to his definition, (which he says is precise and accurate,) is,
"That _perception_ of a real object which _is raised_ in the mind by the
power of _memory_." But among the real objects from which memory may raise
ideas, he includes the workings of the mind itself, or whatever we remember
of our former passions, emotion