a later stage of the war an attempt may be made by
Austria to buy off Italy with the offer of the Trentino. Whether the latter
would seriously consider such an offer, if made, will doubtless depend
upon future events, but it is clear that Italy, if her diplomatists are
sufficiently adroit, has a fair prospect of acquiring the Trentino,
whichever side wins, and consequently that a much more tempting bait will
be required in order to induce her to abandon her neutrality. These two
losses, the one already probable, the other hypothetical, would still leave
Austria in the unquestioned position of a Great Power. The problem of her
future relations with her Balkan neighbours raises an infinitely more
complicated issue. Let us consider the Southern Slav and Roumanian
questions, first separately, and then in their bearing upon each other.

Sec.6. _The Southern Slav Question_.--The Southern Slav question, as
has already been argued in an earlier chapter, can only be treated
satisfactorily as an organic whole; and it may be taken for granted that
Austria-Hungary, in the event of victory, will annex the two independent
Serb kingdoms, and unite the whole Serbo-Croat race under Habsburg rule.
The task of governing them, when once she has overcome their resistance,
will be one of extraordinary difficulty, and will involve a complete
revision of her own standards of government and administration. Her record
and that of Hungary in the Slavonic South does not inspire one with
confidence as to the result. Moreover, it is not too much to assert that
the destruction of Serb independence--a task which the present writer
unhesitatingly regards as beyond the powers of Austria--will in no way
solve the Southern Slav problem, but merely transfer its centre of
gravity. The task of Southern Slav liberation would pass to Bulgaria, and
Austria-Hungary would be involved in an ever-widening field of hostilities.
Hence, even if Serbia's independence were not now inextricably bound up
with the success of the British arms, it would still be essential that
every effort should be made to heal what has long been an open sore upon
the face of Europe. People in this country are only too apt to ignore the
question altogether, or at best to say, "Oh yes, of course, if the Allies
win, the Serbs will get Bosnia." Those who talk thus have not grasped the
elements of the great problem, of which Bosnia, like Serbia itself, is only
one section. The idea that to tran