ntente. Let us then endeavour to
apply these principles to the various problems raised by the war. It is
obvious that their application depends upon the victory of the Allies. If
we are defeated, public law will have lost its value, for the Germans will
have asserted their right to violate its fundamental provisions. The idea
of Nationality will have received its death-blow; for not only will the
independence of several of the smaller nations have been destroyed,
but Germany will have reasserted her right to dominate her own minor
nationalities, and to drain the life-blood of the 26 million Slavs of
Austria-Hungary in a conflict with their own Slavonic kinsmen. Finally,
all hope of reduced armaments will have been exploded, since the theory of
Blood and Iron will have attained its fullest expression in the virtual
domination of a single power on land and sea. Regrets or misgivings we may
have, but the time for their utterance has long since passed. The British
nation must have no illusions; defeat means the downfall of the Empire, and
the reduction of Britain to the position of a second-rate power. Either we
shall emerge victorious, or for all practical purposes we shall not emerge
at all. Even if _we_ shrink from a "fight to a finish," our enemies can be
relied upon to persist to the bitter end. It is for this reason only, and
not because I underestimate for a moment the vast resources, the splendid
organisation, the military valour of Germany, that I restrict myself in
the following pages to a consideration of the possible effects of victory
rather than of defeat. It would be the height of folly to anticipate
victory before it is achieved; but it is essential that we should be
prepared for all possible contingencies, and this involves a careful survey
of the various factors in an extraordinarily complicated situation.

Sec.3. _Britain and Germany._--In the forefront of the discussion stands our
quarrel with Germany. What are to be our future relations with Germany
after the war? If there is anything in the assertion that we are fighting
for the cause of liberty and progress, it can only mean that we are
fighting a system rather than a nation--Prussian militarism and
bureaucracy, but not German civilisation. We have to go still further and
consider the motive powers behind that iron system. Sitting in our little
island, we are apt to forget what it means to possess a purely artificial
frontier of 400 miles, and to see