nes of that
philosophy seem to follow by an easy consequence. For upon the removal
of sounds, colours, beat, cold, and other sensible qualities, from the
rank of continued independent existences, we are reduced merely to what
are called primary qualities, as the only real ones, of which we have
any adequate notion. These primary qualities are extension and solidity,
with their different mixtures and modifications; figure, motion,
gravity, and cohesion. The generation, encrease, decay, and corruption
of animals and vegetables, are nothing but changes of figure and motion;
as also the operations of all bodies on each other; of fire, of light,
water, air, earth, and of all the elements and powers of nature. One
figure and motion produces another figure and motion; nor does there
remain in the material universe any other principle, either active or
passive, of which we can form the most distant idea.

I believe many objections might be made to this system But at present
I shall confine myself to one, which is in my opinion very decisive. I
assert, that instead of explaining the operations of external objects by
its means, we utterly annihilate all these objects, and reduce ourselves
to the opinions of the most extravagant scepticism concerning them. If
colours, sounds, tastes, and smells be merely perceptions, nothing we
can conceive is possest of a real, continued, and independent existence;
not even motion, extension and solidity, which are the primary qualities
chiefly insisted on.

To begin with the examination of motion; it is evident this is a quality
altogether inconceivable alone, and without a reference to some other
object. The idea of motion necessarily supposes that of a body moving.
Now what is our idea of the moving body, without which motion is
incomprehensible? It must resolve itself into the idea of extension or
of solidity; and consequently the reality of motion depends upon that of
these other qualities.

This opinion, which is universally acknowledged concerning motion, I
have proved to be true with regard to extension; and have shewn that it
is impossible to conceive extension, but as composed of parts, endowed
with colour or solidity. The idea of extension is a compound idea;
but as it is not compounded of an infinite number of parts or inferior
ideas, it must at last resolve itself into such as are perfectly simple
and indivisible. These simple and indivisible parts, not being ideas of
extension, m