ficult on the fourth. The camp was pitched in front of
this hill, looking down the valley, with a mile of open country between
it and the hills on the left.

The camp was formed in the following order: on the left were the two
battalions of the 3rd Native Regiment; the Royal Artillery were in the
centre; next to these was the 2nd battalion of the 24th. The line was
then taken up by the cavalry, with the 1st battalion of the 24th on the
right of the whole. The waggons were all placed between the camp and
the hill at the back.

By a strange and criminal neglect no attempt was made to intrench this
position, although it was known that the column might at any moment be
attacked by the Zulus.

It was determined that the greater part of the force should advance the
next morning towards a stronghold, ten miles distant from the camp,
straight down the valley. News had come that a large number of Zulus
were at this spot, and it was supposed that these would fight. The
column consisted of eight companies of each of the battalions of the 3rd
Native Regiment, with the greater part of the cavalry.

The force started early and marched for three hours down the valley.
Here they came on much cultivated ground, but the kraals had been
deserted by the enemy. At four o'clock, as the cavalry were skirmishing
at a distance on both flanks, they came upon a body of Zulus about 2000
strong. The horse fell back upon the infantry, but, as it was now late,
Major Dartnell decided to encamp for the night, and to attack in the
morning. A messenger was despatched into camp with a report of the
day's proceedings, and some provisions and blankets were sent out, with
news that the general would join the troops with reinforcements in the
morning.

At daybreak he left the camp at Isandula with seven companies of the 2nd
battalion of the 24th, and orders were sent to Colonel Durnford, at
Rorke's Drift, to bring up 200 mounted men and his rocket-battery, which
had reached that spot.

The Zulus were seen in all directions, and a good deal of skirmishing
took place. By a gross neglect, equal to that which was manifested in
the omission to fortify the camp, no steps whatever were taken to keep
up communication between the column, which now consisted of the greater
part of the troops, and those who remained at the camp at Isandula. No
signallers were placed on the hills, no mounted videttes were posted,
and the column marched on, absorbed in it