of the Secretary, appears to have voted in the negative. It
was upon the amendment of Mr. ORTH, declaring that the slave should be
free whenever his master had accepted payment for him. On that
amendment the vote of Connecticut was Yea. As the vote is recorded Nay
by mistake, I move to reconsider the vote by which the amendment was
rejected.

Mr. BRONSON:--The motion to reconsider is not necessary. Connecticut
can record her vote as she wishes to have it stand. It will not change
the result.

The PRESIDENT:--I think the motion is in order, if made by
Connecticut.

Mr. BATTELL:--I will move to reconsider. I voted with the majority.

Mr. MOREHEAD, of North Carolina:--No individual delegate can make such
a motion. States vote here, not individuals. I submit that the motion
is out of order, unless made by a majority of the delegation.

Mr. BALDWIN:--The question is not complicated at all; neither is the
motion out of order. A majority of the delegation from Connecticut
cast the vote of that State in favor of Mr. ORTH'S amendment. By
mistake that vote was recorded against the amendment. The same
majority whose vote is made to do them injustice by a mistake for
which its members are not responsible, now moves to reconsider the
vote.

The question was then taken upon Mr. McCURDY'S motion, and resulted as
follows:

AYES.--Connecticut, Illinois, Indiana, Iowa, Maine,
Massachusetts, New York, New Hampshire, Ohio, Vermont and
Kansas--11.

NOES.--Delaware, Kentucky, Maryland, Missouri, New Jersey,
North Carolina, Pennsylvania, Rhode Island, Tennessee, and
Virginia--10.

And the motion prevailed, and the vote was reconsidered.

The PRESIDENT:--The question now recurs upon the amendment offered by
Mr. ORTH. On this amendment the vote will be taken by States.

Mr. WHITE:--I consider this amendment as entirely unnecessary. The
result which it seeks to attain is only the announcement of a
well-understood provision of the common law. By the common law, if an
action is brought for a trespass, and judgment recovered for that
trespass, and the damages under that judgment paid, the property which
is the subject of the action, and which may have originally been
wrongfully taken, becomes transferred; the damages take the place of
the property, the defendant has paid for his wrongful act, or, in
other words, has paid for the property. The same principle applies to
the case of the fugitive slave who