ho indulge
them of the power to do harm; when just they but hasten the certainty
with which the great body of our citizens never fail to repel an attempt
to procure their sanction to any exercise of power inconsistent with the
jealous maintenance of their rights. Under such convictions, and
entertaining no doubt that my constitutional obligations demanded the
steps which were taken in reference to the removal of the deposits, it
was impossible for me to be deterred from the path of duty by a fear
that my motives could be misjudged or that political prejudices could
defeat the just consideration of the merits of my conduct. The result
has shewn how safe is this reliance upon the patriotic temper and
enlightened discernment of the people. That measure has now been before
them and has stood the test of all the severe analysis which its general
importance, the interests it affected, and the apprehensions it excited
were calculated to produce, and it now remains for Congress to consider
what legislation has become necessary in consequence.

I need only add to what I have on former occasions said on this subject
generally that in the regulations which Congress may prescribe
respecting the custody of the public moneys it is desirable that as
little discretion as may be deemed consistent with their safe-keeping
should be given to the executive agents. No one can be more deeply
impressed than I am with the soundness of the doctrine which restrains
and limits, by specific provisions, executive discretion, as far as it
can be done consistently with the preservation of its constitutional
character. In respect to the control over the public money this doctrine
is peculiarly applicable, and is in harmony with the great principle
which I felt I was sustaining in the controversy with the Bank of the
United States, which has resulted in severing to some extent a dangerous
connection between a moneyed and political power. The duty of the
Legislature to define, by clear and positive enactments, the nature and
extent of the action which it belongs to the Executive to superintend
springs out of a policy analogous to that which enjoins upon all the
branches of the Federal Government an abstinence from the exercise of
powers not clearly granted.

In such a Government, possessing only limited and specific powers, the
spirit of its general administration can not be wise or just when it
opposes the reference of all doubtful points to the great