protocol that the last courier he had received had been arrested and
detained a considerable time by several Russian general officers, who had
obliged him to deliver up his despatches, which had not been returned to
him till thirty-six hours after at Chaumont. Caulaincourt justly
complained of this infraction of the law of nations and established
usage, which, he said, was the sole cause of the delay in bringing the
negotiations to a conclusion. After this complaint he communicated to
the Congress the ostensible instructions of Napoleon, in which he
authorised his Minister to accede to the demands of the Allies. But in
making this communication M. de Caulaincourt took care not to explain the
private and secret instructions he had also received. The Allies
rejected the armistice because it would have checked their victorious
advance; but they consented to sign the definitive peace, which of all
things was what the Emperor did not wish.
Napoleon at length determined to make sacrifices, and the Duke of Vicenza
submitted new propositions to the Congress. The Allies replied, in the
same sitting, that these propositions contained no distinct and explicit
declaration on the project presented by them on the 17th of February;
that, having on the 28th of the same month, demanded a decisive answer
within the term of ton days, they were about to break up the negotiations
Caulaincourt then declared verbally:
1st. That the Emperor Napoleon was ready to renounce all pretension or
influence whatever in countries beyond the boundaries of France.
2d. To recognise the independence of Spain, Italy, Switzerland, Germany,
and Holland, and that as to England, France would make such concessions
as might be deemed necessary in consideration of a reasonable equivalent.
Upon this the sitting was immediately broken up without a reply. It must
be remarked that this singular declaration was verbal, and consequently
not binding, and that the limits of France were mentioned without being
specified. It cannot be doubted that Napoleon meant the limits conceded
at Frankfort, to which he was well convinced the Allies would not
consent, for circumstances were now changed. Besides, what could be
meant by the reasonable equivalent from England? Is it astonishing that
this obscurity and vagueness should have banished all confidence on the
part of the Plenipotentiaries of the Allied powers? Three days after the
sitting of the 10th of March they declared
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