of Napoleon or to see Holland united to France. He chose the latter,
though not before he had exerted all his feeble power in behalf of the
subjects whom Napoleon had consigned to him; but he would not be the
accomplice of the man who had resolved to make those subjects the victims
of his hatred against England. Who, indeed, could be so blind as not to
see that the ruin of the Continent would be the triumph of British
commerce?
Louis was, however, permitted to return to his States to contemplate the
stagnating effect of the Continental blockade on every branch of trade
and industry formerly so active in Holland. Distressed at witnessing
evils to which he could apply no remedy, he endeavoured by some prudent
remonstrances to avert the utter, ruin with which Holland was threatened.
On the 23d of March 1810 he wrote the following letter to Napoleon:--
If you wish to consolidate the present state of France, to obtain
maritime peace, or to attack England with advantage, those objects
are not to be obtained by measures like the blockading system, the
destruction of a kingdom raised by yourself, or the enfeebling of
your allies, and setting at defiance their most sacred rights and
the first principles of the law of nations. You should, on the
contrary, win their affections for France, and consolidate and
reinforce your allies, making them like your brothers, in whom you
may place confidence. The destruction of Holland, far from being
the means of assailing England, will serve only to increase her
strength, by all the industry and wealth which will fly to her for
refuge. There are, in reality, only three ways of assailing
England, namely, by detaching Ireland, getting possession of the
East Indies, or by invasion. These two latter modes, which would be
the most effectual, cannot be executed without naval force. But I
am astonished that the first should have been so easily
relinquished. That is a more secure mode of obtaining peace on good
conditions than the system of injuring ourselves for the sake of
committing a greater injury upon the enemy.
(Signed) LOUIS.
Written remonstrances were no more to Napoleon's taste than verbal ones
at a time when, as I was informed by my friends whom fortune chained to
his destiny, no one presumed to address a word to him except in answer to
his questions. Cambaceres, who alone had retained that privilege in
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